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Prenatal Injuries
Andrew L. Johnson, Jr. *
O UR COURTS HAVE BEEN INCREASINGLY PERPLEXED by the ques-
tion of whether or not an infant should have a right of
action for personal injuries negligently caused to its body prior
to birth. Stated another way, does an infant while in its mother's
womb have an interest in the freedom from invasion of its bodily
security equivalent to and commensurate with that of a person
already born?1 Until recently, the question had been answered
almost uniformly in the negative; 2 the courts holding a prenatal
injury to be no basis for an action in tort in favor of the child or
its next of kin.
An early United States case dealing with the question is
Dietrich, Admr. v. Inhabitants of Northampton,3 decided in 1884.
A woman between four and five months pregnant was injured
by falling on a defective highway. As a result of the fall, the
infant was born prematurely, lived for only a few minutes and
died. The Massachusetts court, speaking through Holmes, J.,
denied recovery principally on the ground that "the unborn
child was a part of the mother at the time of the injury" and that
"any damage to it which was not too remote to be recovered for
at all was recoverable by her (the mother)." 4
Since the Dietrich case a majority of jurisdictions have
denied recovery on various grounds, without regard to whether
or not the fetus was viable.5 However, following two recent
decisions, Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit Co. 6 and Verkennes
* B.S., Northwestern University; a third year student at Cleveland-Marshall
Law School.
1 Note, 36 Va. L. R. 611 (1950).
2 52 Am. Jur., Torts, 440.
3 138 Mass. 14; 52 Am. Rep. 242 (1884).
4 Ibid.
5 See Tursi v. New England Windsor Co., 19 Conn. Sup. 242, 111 A. 2d 14
(1955). This case gives the principal reasons favoring a denial of recovery.
6 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N. E. 2d 334 (1949); Noted, 35 Corn. L. Q. 648 (1949-50)
and 63 Harv. L. Rev. 173 (1949). The Williams case is the first decision by
an American court of final jurisdiction to hold, in the absence of a statute,
that a child who survives birth can bring an action for injuries incurred
before birth.
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v. Corniea,7 several jurisdictions have allowed recovery either in
favor of the infant or its next of kin.8
In the Williams case, a suit was brought to recover damages
for injuries to a viable child en ventre sa mere. The injury oc-
curred when the mother fell while alighting from a street car,
allegedly caused by the defendant transit company's negligence.
The Supreme Court of Ohio held that since the plaintiff was
viable at the time of the alleged negligent injury, she was a
"person" within the purview of Article I, Section 16 of the
Ohio Constitution, which provides that "every person, for an in-
jury done him in his . . . person . .. shall have remedy by due
course of law . .. ."
Verkennes v. Corniea was an action for the wrongful death
of an unborn child, allegedly due to the negligence of the de-
fendant hospital during the period of confinement and treatment
of the mother before childbirth. The Supreme Court of Min-
nesota held that an action by the personal representative of the
decedent could be maintained on behalf of the decedent's next of
kin under a wrongful death statute.
Most of the jurisdictions which have allowed recovery have
limited it to cases where the fetus was proved to have been
viable9 at the time the injury was inflicted. The reasoning is
that whenever a child is so far advanced in prenatal age that,
should natural or artificial parturition occur, the child could live
separately from its mother, and is thereafter born and lives, such
child has a right of action for any injuries wantonly or negli-
gently inflicted while in its mother's womb. Before such a time
the child is only a part of its mother, while thereafter it is con-
sidered as something more. Recovery has been limited to the
viable stage because the problem of proof of causation increases
as the injury occurs earlier in the period of gestation. However,
7 229 Minn. 365, 38 N. W. 2d 838 (1949); 10 A. L. R. 2d 634.
s Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 114 N. E. 2d 412 (1953); Mallison v. Pomeroy,
291 P. 2d 225 (Ore., 1955); Tucker v. Howard L. Carmichael & Sons, Inc.,
208 Ga. 201, 65 S. E. 2d 909 (1951), and Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line
Co., 212 Ga. 504, 93 S. E. 2d 727 (1956); Poliquin v. MacDonald, 135 A. 2d
249 (N. H., 1957); Steggall v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1224, 258 S. W. 2d 577 (1953);
Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 79 A. 2d 550 (1951); Rainey v. Horn,
221 Miss. 269, 72 S. 2d 434 (1954); Woods v. Lancet, 303 N. Y. 349, 102 N. E.
2d 691 (1951); Tursi v. New England Windsor Co., 19 Conn. Sup. 242, 111 A.
2d 14 (1955).
9 A "viable" fetus is one sufficiently developed for extra-uterine survival,
normally a fetus of seven months or older. Also see N. Y. Times, Sept. 25,
1949, Sec. 1, pg. 75, col. 2 for report that the viability age is now being re-
duced to the order of six months.
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in Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co.10 the Georgia Court,
in allowing recovery, said:
At what particular moment after conception or at what par-
ticular period the prenatal existence of the child the injury
was inflicted is not controlling, for, as was said in Morrow
v. Scott, 7 Ga. 535, 537, "In ... general, a child is to be con-
sidered as in being, from the time of its conception, where
it will be for the benefit of such child to be so considered."
If a child after an injury sustained at any period of its pre-
natal life can prove the effect on it of a tort, it would have a
right to recover.
Keeping in mind the foregoing concise historical background
regarding the question, a critical examination of the arguments
advanced in favor of allowing recovery where the fetus was
proved to have been viable will reveal apparent weaknesses of
those arguments..
It has been commonly argued that an unborn viable child
is capable of existing independently from its mother and, hence,
should be regarded as a separate entity." This argument may
have some merit, but it is rendered less potent because it is
based upon the questionable concept of viability. In order for a
child to be viable it is necessary that not only its organs be
adequately developed, but that there be no congenital abnor-
malities capable of opposing the establishment or continuation
of its life.
It is important to distinguish between a viable and a non-
viable child, although the latter may outlive the former. The
viable child may die of some disease on the day of its birth,
while a non-viable child may live for two weeks. The former
possesses the organs essential to life in their entirety, while the
latter has some imperfection which prevents the complete estab-
lishment of life. The fact that a child dies within a few hours of
its birth is no evidence of non-viability, nor do the facts that a
child appears to be well and its functions of respiration fully es-
tablished prove viability.
There are many afflictions and abnormalities that a child may
have at birth which are not necessarily fatal. Such infants are
considered to be viable. There are also many diseases which,
without being necessarily fatal, are an impediment to the estab-
lishment of independent life and affect different parts of the sys-
10 212 Ga. 504, 93 S. E. 2d 727 (1956).
11 Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D. C., D. C. 1946); supra n. 6.
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tem. Inflammation and some malformations belong to this sec-
ond class. There is a third class in which the afflictions are
necessarily fatal. These children are non-viable. These dis-
tinctions are of great importance. Afflictions of the second type
may constitute extenuating circumstance in questions of in-
fanticide; while those of the third admit of little discussion on
the subject of their viability.12 Infants born one to two months
prematurely have excellent chances for survival. However, the
greater the period of prematurity, the less chance of survival.
The point where viability and non-viability meet is indefinite and
difficult to fix.'
3
The novelty of the Williams case 1 4 is over-shadowed by the
Verkennes case 5 which allows the estate of a viable child
who is born dead to recover under a wrongful death
statute. Although some recovery to the mother may be de-
sirable where the child is stillborn . . . such recovery
should not come through the estate of a foetus that is never
born alive merely because it was once viable. However, this
result seems to follow logically from the viability theory.
The difficulty would seem to lie with that theory itself,
which is too broad in that it allows recovery in the Ver-
kennes situation and too narrow in that it would not aid a
surviving child injured before viability.16
Since the law recognizes an unborn child sufficiently to pro-
tect its property rights and rights of inheritance, and protects it
against the crimes of others, the law should also recognize its
separate existence for the purpose of redressing torts. It is clear
that a child en ventre sa mere is far from a nonentity. He may
be an executor. He may take under the Statute of Distributions.
He may take by devise. He may have an injunction, and he may
have a guardian. 17 His status both in criminal law' and in the
law of property19 is established. The reason that he is recognized
as a person in property law depends on special property rules.
12 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 1213 (Students Edition, 1934).
13 Taylor, Principles and Practice of Medical Jurisprudence, 34 (10th ed.,
1948).
14 Supra n. 6.
15 Supra n. 7.
16 Note, 63 Harv. L. R. 174 (1949-50).
'7 Thellusson v. Woodford, 4 Ves. 227, 321, 31 Eng. Rep. 117, 163 (1799).
18 Clarke v. State, 117 Ala. 1, 23 S. 671 (1898); The Queen v. West, 2 Car. &
K. 784, 175 Eng. Rep. 329 (N. P. 1848); Rex v. Senior, 1 Mood 346, 168 Eng.
Rep. 1298 (C. C. 1832).
19 Mallison v. Pomeroy, supra n. 8; Villar v. Gilbey, A. C. 139 (1907); Note,
20 Harv. L. Rev. 651 (1907).
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His rights do not come into existence until birth, and then they
relate back. However, this function of relation does not involve
any idea of the child as a separate entity, and at best it is a
special equitable provision.
The criminal law is harder to understand. It is murder or
manslaughter if one injures an unborn child, if that child is born
alive, and later dies of the injury.20 It is argued that every
murder must of necessity be a tort and that, therefore, there has
been a tort against the child in the womb. The answer to this
contention probably is that the criminal law has erred in placing
this crime against the child in the category of murder. The
crime properly belongs in the same category with the offense of
causing an abortion. The fundamental concept of murder or
manslaughter is the application of some force to a human being
resulting in death. The crime in the eyes of the law occurs, not
at the time and place of the death, but at the time and place of
the prisoner's act. Therefore, if the child has a right of action, it
must arise at the time of the injury; but at that time it is uncer-
tain whether the child will be born alive, and thus a right of ac-
tion is created which is contingent on the child being born alive.
The cases that have called the crime murder or manslaughter
have stated no convincing reasons.21 Also it is well established
that the reason an unborn infant may be the object of homicide
is not because he is capable of individual rights, but only be-
cause of the state's interest in human life.
Those who would allow recovery have also unduly minimized
the difficulty of proving the causal connection between the
tortious act and the subsequent physical defect. Winfield, in
referring to cases where the injury precedes birth by a substan-
tial period of time, states:
As I have indicated, such members of the medical profession
as I have sounded on the question were of the opinion that in
general no one can positively and truthfully assert in such
a case that there is a pathological connection between the
prenatal injury and postnatal affliction. 22
There are many general diseases of the mother which are
likely to result in fetal death. Medical authority asserts that
there is no way in any specific instance to distinguish between
20 Supra n. 16.
21 Notes, 12 Harv. L. Rev. 209-216 (1898-99); 13 Harv. L. Rev. 521 (1899).
22 Winfield, "The Unborn Child," 4 Toronto L. J. 278, 293 (1942), reprinted
in 8 Camb. L. J. 76 (1942).
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deformities caused by trauma and those caused by other factors
inherent in the female such as nutritional or physiological de-
ficiencies. Moreover, whether trauma can cause a deformity is
open to doubt.23
Miscarriage is the term limited to between the 12th and 28th
weeks, and viability abortion is the expulsion of a fetus up to 3
months of age. After the viability the process is spoken of as
premature labor. With delivery before this time there is little
likelihood of continued life.
The causes of abortion, miscarriage, and premature labor
are legion. Almost anything which may mechanically, chemi-
cally, or physiologically interfere with the normal development
of the child may lead directly to its death, or to early separation
of the after-birth, whose firm attachment to the uterus is
necessary to continued life.
In spite of careful studies, the part played by over-exertion,
a jar, mis-step, tripping, douches, and fright have not been de-
termined. Modern belief inclines far more toward relegating
them to the role of coincidence than formerly. It is common
knowledge that the rudest manipulations ordinarily do not
produce abortion even in the presence of predisposing causes of
major significance. The insertion of bougies or balloons inflated
within the uterus are frequently non-effective. Admittedly,
trauma sufficient to cause rupture of the sac with escape of
amniotic fluid may be sufficient. The genital organs are so well
protected that damage is extremely rare. Fracture of the pelvis
very rarely leads to abortion. The pregnant uterus is so freely
movable, slipping easily within the abdomen, that fragments of
bone almost never damage the organ to the slightest degree.
24
In view of the extremely difficult problem of proof, an ex-
tension of the viability rule will probably accentuate the danger
of over-sympathetic juries granting relief where the plaintiff's
evidence of causation is at most fragmentary.25 Another factor
which must be considered is the effect which the contributory
negligence of the mother has on the child's right to recover.
26
The general rule formulated in the Restatement of the Law
of Torts is that:
23 Note, Syracuse L. R. 116 (Fall, 1956).
24 1 Gray, Attorney's Textbook of Medicine, 596, 598-599 (1949).
25 Supra n. 16.
26 Note, 35 Va. L. R. 626 (1949).
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"A person who negligently causes harm to an unborn child
is not liable to such child for the harm." 27
Another author states that:
Prenatal injuries furnish no basis for an action by a child
or its personal representative. Such injuries, when inflicted,
are injuries to the mother, the child in the mother's womb
having no separate existence of its own. The mother of an
unborn child may recover damages to her and it if such in-
jury and damage are not too remote.21
In recent years there has been a great deal of litigation and
writing on the question here under discussion, but it appears
that few have come forth with an adequate solution to what is
admittedly a very difficult and complex problem. The most rea-
sonable approach would probably be through legislative action.
If an unborn child is to be endowed with a right of action for
personal injuries negligently caused to its body some time prior
to birth, that right should not be created by a judicial decision
based on the facts in a single case. Instead, that right should be
the product of legislative action taken after hearings at which
the legislature can be advised, by the aid of medical science and
research, not only as to the age at which a fetus is considered
viable, but also as to appropriate means-by time limitation for
suit and otherwise-for avoiding abuses, which might, and have
resulted, from the difficulty of tracing causation from prenatal
injury to postnatal deformity.29
A change in the common law, like the one under considera-
tion, cannot safely be made without the kind of factual investiga-
tion for which the legislature, and not the courts, is equipped.
It requires elaborate research and the consideration of perhaps
a variety of possible remedies, and such questions are peculiarly
appropriate for scrutiny by a law revision commission. California
has handled the problem through legislative action, apparently
with success. 30 Justice Almand, dissenting in Hornbuckle v.
Plantation Pipe Company,31 brought out the need for a statutory
remedy when he said:
The majority opinion in the instant case in effect holds that
an infant becomes a "person" from the moment of concep-
27 4 Restatement of The Law of Torts, par. 869 (1939).
28 1 Shearman and Redfield on Negligence, par. 142 (Revised ed., 1941).
29 See dissenting opinion in Woods v. Lancet, supra n. 8, for a discussion
of the remedy through legislative action.
30 Norman v. Murphy, 268 P. 2d 178 (Calif., 1954).
31 Supra n. 8.
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tion, with the right to sue for a tortious injury after its birth.
We reached the limit of reasonableness in the Tucker case,
and I am now unwilling, in the absence of legislation, to
extend that case and to hold the life of a person, possessing
or forming the subject of individual personality, begins when
the male and female elements of procreation unite to form
the seed of a person. Assuredly, we could not call an acorn
a tree. The eternal riddle, which comes first, the egg or the
chicken, can be solved by saying they are one and the same.
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